



Choice experiment assessment of public expenditure preferences 
 





Preferences for changes to public expenditures were evaluated using a choice 
experiment. Results indicate potential efficiency gains from reallocation of expenditures 
to items with higher marginal welfare. In particular, respondents were found to prefer 
more spending on health, education and the environment, with health spending 
providing the highest marginal benefits. The public preferred less expenditure on income 
support. The choice experiment also identified the impacts of demographic factors. The 
approach is offered as a complement to prior approaches that research public preferences 
for budget allocation, with prospects for revelation of richer information for informing 
social decisions. 
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Analysis of public preferences for government expenditures has taken a variety of forms. 
Research has addressed the scale of government spending (Gemmell et al., 2003; Preston 
& Ridge, 1995), preferences for “redistribution” (Fong, 2001; Alesina & La Ferrara, 
2005; Alesina & Giuliano, 2009), and whether expenditure on particular items should be 
More, the Same, or Less (MSL) than the existing allocation (e.g. Ferris, 1983; Lewis & 
Jackson, 1985; Hills, 2002; Delaney & O’Toole, 2007). Budget games provide another 
avenue for assessing public preferences. In these games people either reallocate 
expenditures without changing total spending (Bondonio & Marchese, 1994), allocate 
surplus funds (Alvarez & McCaffery, 2003; Blomquist et al., 2000, 2003; Israelsson & 
Kriström, 2001) or cut portfolio budgets to meet a predetermined reduction in total 
spending (de Groot & Pommer, 1987, 1989). Psychologists have used category rating 
and magnitude estimation approaches (Kemp, 2002). 
The MSL approach is easy to apply, but provides relatively little information. MSL 
cannot identify the preferred scale of government expenditure, or the optimal allocation 
of spending between competing items. Budget games yield more information than MSL. 
Games with budget constraints can be useful for providing information about 
preferences for the distribution of small budget changes. Games in which the total 
budget is unrestricted can provide useful information about preferences for large budget 
changes, including optimal scale, but do not provide information on changes at the 
margin. Category rating and magnitude estimation can be useful for measuring total or 
marginal benefits (e.g. Kemp & Willetts, 1995), although negative values cannot be 
measured, even though they are feasible and relevant to optimal allocations. Category 
rating can be used to rank benefits from alternative expenditure categories. However, 
unlike MSL and unconstrained budget games, the use of ratio measurement scales 
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precludes estimates of marginal rates of substitution, which are required for optimally 
adjusting government expenditures.  
The social welfare function is W(X1, X2, … , Xn, Z).  Xi is the amount of government 
funding allocated to portfolio i (Xi ≥ 0) and Z is the total amount of tax money spent on 
these portfolios (Z = ΣiWi). Additional spending on any portfolio has two effects. It 
changes welfare because of the outcomes from spending on the specific portfolio 
(δW/δXi), the sign of which will be positive if additional spending is perceived to 
produce “goods”, but is unknown a priori. The second effect arises from the source of 
the additional funds, which can come from two locations: increased taxes, which are 
expected to diminish community welfare directly (dWi = DZ;  δW/δZ < 0), reduction in 
spending in other portfolios (δW/δXj, j≠i), or some combination of the two. Optimal 
budget allocation involves maximising W subject to the constraints that (i) all Xi are 
non-negative, and (ii) the total budget equals Z, which can be fixed or variable. Trivially, 
the optimal first-order conditions for an internal solution (W must be twice-
differentiable) are δW/δXi = δW/δXj  i,j. In addition, when Z is a variable the optimal 
level of taxation requires δW/δXi = -δW/δZ  i. Marginal welfare should be equated 
across portfolios and should offset the loss in welfare arising from appropriation of 
taxes.  
 
The study  
We explore a fresh approach towards providing information about preferences for 
government budget allocations. Choice experiments can inform government allocation 
decisions by deriving a welfare function, which can provide measures of (i) strength of 
preference for allocating marginal budget to specific portfolios, (ii) optimal total budget, 
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and (iii) optimal allocation over portfolios.  
Choice experiments are attribute based methods that present alternative products or 
policies that differ on a number of attributes. Experiment participants select their single 
preferred alternative, mimicking a political process. Each participant may make several 
choices between different sets of alternatives, which are designed to provide suitable 
data for application of random utility models to estimate the welfare function (Louviere 
et al., 2000; Bennett & Blamey, 2001; Hensher et al., 2005).  
A choice experiment was applied to test optimality of New Zealand budget allocation 
amongst four portfolios: health, education, income support (support), and conservation 
and environmental management (environment). Data were collected as part of a self-
completed mail survey of registered voters that sought perceptions of the state of the 
New Zealand environment (Hughey et al., 2002). The response rate to the March 2002 
survey was 45% (n = 836).   
Space limitations in the survey dictated a single extremely simple choice question 
(Figure 1). Nine choice sets, each comprised of three alternatives for spending on the 
four portfolios, were derived using an orthogonal design (Hahn & Shapiro, 1966). The 
alternatives covered selected combinations of $50 million more, the same, or $50 million 
less annual spending on each of the portfolios. Options entailed total budget changes 
across the range of ±$200 million relative to the existing budget for these portfolios. The 
nine choice sets were evenly distributed across the survey sample so that each 
respondent was presented with only one choice set. Respondents identified the single 
alternative that they preferred from the three alternatives in the choice set presented to 
them. Figure 1 shows one of the choice sets. Information was provided on government 
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spending on each of these items on the expectation that survey participants would be 
unaware of such matters (Kemp, 2009). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Statistical methods 
Modelling assumed a linear welfare function, which is limited because it does not 
accommodate diminishing marginal welfare, which is necessary for an internal solution 
to the budget allocation problem. However, for small changes it is possible to 
approximate the welfare function using a linear form. Relative to the current budget, 
proposed changes were 0.4% (Support), 0.7% (Education and Health), and 10% 
(Environment). Further support of the linear utility function assumption is provided by 
Kemp and Willetts (1995), who found no significant difference in ratings for a 5% 
increase or a 5% decrease in provision of specific New Zealand government services. 
 
The underlying linear welfare function is: 
W  = 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 + 4X4 + 5Z (1) 
The total welfare effect of a purely tax-funded change in spending on portfolio i is: 
dW/dXi   = d(1dX1 + 2dX2 + 3dX3+ 4dX4 + 5dZ)/dXi 
 = i + 5 
Because Z is a linear function of the other parameters, it is not possible to identify (1). 
However, it is possible to identify (2): 
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W  = 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 + 4X4  (2) 
Where  i = i+5 = dW/dXi 
i is net marginal welfare of spending on portfolio i, which includes the benefits 
obtained from spending on the portfolio, as well as the disutility of paying higher taxes 
to fund that additional spending. This is the model that was fitted to the data. 
 
Results 
Linear welfare functions estimated with multinomial logit models are reported in Table 
1. Polynomial and logarithmic welfare functions were estimated, but provided no 
improvement over the simple linear model, which is unsurprising given the small scale 
of expenditure changes. Latent class and random parameters models failed to improve 
model fit.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
These models have only moderate predictive ability. However, the independent variables 
are all highly significant. The SUPPORT coefficients are negative, with asymptotic Z-
scores of  -7.0, indicating a definite preference for reduced spending on income support. 
The three other portfolio coefficients are all significantly positive, indicating preferences 
for increased spending on those items. Model B is preferred to Model A on all three 
statistical criteria in Table 1, a conclusion which is confirmed by a likelihood ratio test 
(χ2=47.72, 4 dof). Unlike the other portfolios, marginal welfare from health spending did 




For efficiency, as judged by the public, whenever marginal welfare net of tax (i) is 
positive taxes should be increased to allow additional spending on portfolio i and vice 
versa. Additional taxes are justified to support increased spending on HEALTH, 
EDUCATION and ENVIRONMENT. On the other hand, efficiency is enhanced by reducing 
expenditure on SUPPORT in order to lower taxes. However, the linear utility function 
approximation precludes identification of optimal magnitudes of expenditure and tax 
changes.  
Another possibility is reallocation of existing expenditures without change to the total 
tax take. Any increase of spending in one portfolio requires reductions in spending in at 
least one other portfolio. When spending on one item (Xj) is reduced to allow increased 
spending on another (Xi) with a balanced budget (dXj = -dXi), the change in welfare is 
dW = idXi + jdXj. Hence: dW/dXi = i - j = αi – αj. Efficiency is enhanced whenever 
expenditure is transferred from lower marginal welfare to higher marginal welfare 
portfolios. With a linear welfare function all spending should be transferred to the item 
with the largest marginal welfare net of tax (i). Table 2 provides estimates of 
differences in marginal welfares and their significance, estimated using a Monte Carlo 
procedure (Krinsky and Robb, 1986).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
The marginal welfare differences (i - j) allow the items to be ranked. A positive 
difference indicates that marginal spending on portfolio i yields more welfare than 
spending on portfolio j. Welfare would be improved by transferring spending from item j 
to item i in such cases. Two marginal welfare differences in Model B are not 
significantly different from zero, so Model B is unable to provide a full ranking of 
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HEALTH, EDUCATION and ENVIRONMENT for the 50 year old in the example. HEALTH 
spending is significantly more valuable than ENVIRONMENT spending, but the differences 
between HEALTH and EDUCATION and between EDUCATION and ENVIRONMENT are 
unclear. Expenditure on any other portfolio provides more marginal welfare than 
spending on SUPPORT. 
For Model A it is possible to conclude that HEALTH spending provides more benefits 
than either ENVIRONMENT or EDUCATION spending. The following hierarchy of marginal 
welfares applies with better than 95% confidence: HEALTH > {EDUCATION, 
ENVIRONMENT} > 0 > SUPPORT. 
Predictions from Model B vary significantly with respondent age (Table 3). Marginal 
welfares for HEALTH, EDUCATION and ENVIRONMENT are larger than for SUPPORT for all 
age groups, except for 70 year olds who no longer have a clear preference for 
ENVIRONMENT spending over SUPPORT. There are no significant differences in marginal 
welfare for ENVIRONMENT and EDUCATION for any age group. However, younger 
respondents were more likely to value ENVIRONMENT and EDUCATION spending more 
highly than HEALTH spending. This outcome is similar to results from category rating of 
New Zealand health budget preferences (Kemp & Burt, 2001). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Discussion 
This preliminary study addressed budget allocations for a narrow range of government 
services and for small changes in portfolio expenditures. Results nevertheless indicated 
preferences for reduced spending on income support, a strong desire to spend more on 
health, and willingness to support additional spending on education and the 
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environment, consistent with category rating studies. These results are consistent with 
other studies. The highest marginal value ratings in New Zealand category rating studies 
are achieved by health, education and police, with environment ranking in the middle 
range, and spending on income support always rated lowly (Kemp & Willetts, 1995; 
Kemp, 1998, 2003; Kemp & Burt, 2001).  
Choice experiments allow application of mathematical models of preferences, which 
provides opportunities to statistically derive estimates of marginal utility, which are of 
value for estimating optimal budget allocations based on preferences - an advantage over 
other approaches. This suggests that further use of the approach on a broader range of 
services should be considered as well as including a broader range of demographic 
factors (Delaney and O’Toole, 2008a), as well as larger expenditure changes and designs 
suitable for estimating non-linear welfare functions. Results then could be compared 
directly with budget game outcomes. SUPPORT incorporates a large number of sub-
categories (e.g. pensions, unemployment benefit, single parent support) which may be 
judged quite differently (Lewis and Jackson, 1985; Delaney and O’Toole, 2008b). 
Disaggregation of SUPPORT may provide guidance about relative desirability of 
components of this portfolio. 
The choice experiment approach to identification of efficient budget allocation is novel. 
This preliminary study has successfully estimated marginal welfare differences between 
portfolios within relatively narrow confidence intervals. There is potential to use choice 
experiments to identify marginal benefits as well as optimal budget allocations. This 
gives the choice experiment approach a theoretical advantage over category rating, 
budget games and MSL. This preliminary trial of the choice approach to modelling 
community preferences, along with the potential advantages the approach offers, 
indicates the method has strong potential and suggests that further research into design 
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Table 1: Multinomial Logit Models 
 Model A Model B 
HEALTH 1.088 E-2*** 1.163 E-2*** 
EDUCATION 8.259 E-3*** 2.222 E-2*** 
SUPPORT -6.996 E-3*** -2.460 E-2*** 
ENVIRONMENT 6.859 E-2*** 2.137 E-2*** 
AGE*EDUCATION  -2.635 E-4*** 
AGE*SUPPORT  3.353 E-4*** 
AGE*ENVIRONMENT  -2.782 E-4*** 
Akaike Information Criterion 1.873 1.810 
Bayesian Information Criterion 1.898 1.855 
Adjusted ρ2 0.093 0.126 
Significance levels * (10%), ** (5%), *** (1%)
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Table 2: Marginal utility differences 
i j i - j 
 Model A  Model B# 
HEALTH EDUCATION 0.0026** 0.0025* 
HEALTH ENVIRONMENT 0.0040*** 0.0041*** 
EDUCATION ENVIRONMENT 0.0014 0.0016 
HEALTH SUPPORT 0.0179*** 0.0194*** 
EDUCATION SUPPORT 0.0153*** 0.0170*** 
ENVIRONMENT SUPPORT 0.0139*** 0.0153*** 
# Differences are age-dependent. The marginal utility differences are for 
a 50 year old. 
Significance levels * (10%), ** (5%), *** (1%) 
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 -  
SUPPORT 
20 -0.0042* -0.0053** 0.0011 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.035***
30 -0.0014 -0.0027 0.0013 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029***
40 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.023***
50 0.0041*** 0.0026* 0.0016 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.017***
60 0.0070*** 0.0052*** 0.0017 0.0092*** 0.016*** 0.011***
70 0.0097*** 0.0079*** 0.0019 0.0030 0.013*** 0.0049**





Figure 1: Example of a choice question 
The New Zealand government spends about $36 billion each year on a range of public 
services. 
 
Suppose the government were thinking about changing the amount it spent on health, 
education, income support, and conservation and environmental management. Any increase in 
total spending on these items would result in a tax increase, but reduced spending could lower 
taxes. You are asked for your opinion on the following options. You might think there are 
better options than these ones, but they are the only options you can choose from for now. 
Which option do you prefer? 
 




Change in spending each year ($ million) 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Health $7,000 m. $50 m. less no change $50 m. more 
Education $6,733 m. $50 m. less $50 m. more no change 
Income support $13,000 m. $50 m. less $50 m. more no change 
Conservation and 
environmental management 
$500 m. $50 m. less no change $50 m. more 
Change in total taxes collected $200 m less $100 m more $100 m more 
 
 I like option 1 best 
 I like option 2 best 
 I like option 3 best 
